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 Do we selectively attend to the task we are currently performing only through the 
facilitation of goal relevant information or do we also actively inhibit irrelevant and 
potentially distracting information? The three experiments reported here addressed the 
role of inhibition in the task selection process, specifically in situations that involve task 
switching. The first two experiments used experimental designs that allowed us to 
investigate the role of backward inhibition in task switching in novel ways, finding that 
backward inhibition is associated with bivalent (Experiment 1A) and univalent 
(Experiment 1B) target stimuli. The use of bivalent stimuli in Experiment 1A also 
allowed for the evaluation of whether the recently abandoned task set was actively 
inhibited or whether it showed residual activation and resulted in proactive interference. 
Experiment 2 used explicit as well as transition cues (“repeat” or “switch”) with three 
tasks in order to separate the processes of activating a specific new task from disengaging 
the previous task. This design also allowed us to measure inhibition during the trial on 
which it occurred as opposed to previous work on the inhibition of task sets which could 
only measure the cost of overcoming inhibition applied on previous trials. Results from 
all three experiments suggest that inhibitory processes associated with disengagement 
from old task sets play a significant role in the task switching process and, more 
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The human cognitive system is endowed with a limited capacity of information 
processing resources (i.e., Kahneman 1973), yet there are nearly infinite possible 
thoughts or objects in the environment that could be attended to. A prominent issue in of 
the study of attention has been how information relevant to one’s current goals is let into 
the system for further processing while irrelevant information is “filtered” out (e.g., 
Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1960). Such a process of selective attention is necessary for 
coherent, efficient, and organized thought and behavior to occur. Selective attention, 
then, is a critical mechanism of cognitive control, operating by selecting goal relevant 
representations for processing while filtering out irrelevant information that may divert 
limited processing resources. 
This problem of selective attention was highlighted in some of the earliest work in 
modern psychology. William James’s (1890) often quoted definition describes attention 
as being “the taking possession by the mind in clear and vivid form, of one out of what 
seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought… [attention] implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.” Attention then for 
James was not only a process of enhancing, facilitating, or activating relevant objects or 
thoughts, it was also a process of withdrawing from, or inhibiting, irrelevant ones. 
Inhibition played a central role in early psychological accounts; not only for James, but 





early days of modern psychology, however, theorists noted that definitive empirical 
evidence distinguishing facilitatory and inhibitory accounts of attention was lacking 
(Pillsbury, 1908). More recent work in selective attention focused on where in processing 
stream selective attention operates (e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Treisman, 1964) and 
whether processing resources are allocated in the process of selection (e.g., Johnston & 
Heinz, 1978), but the question of how selection is achieved, specifically whether through 
the facilitation of relevant information, the inhibition of irrelevant information, or both, 
has remained largely open (see Dagenbach & Carr, 1994).  
The experiments reported here addressed the question of inhibition in the domain of 
task selection and task switching. Specifically we asked whether tasks are made available 
for action only through activating the newly relevant information or whether processes 
that inhibit old, irrelevant information are also involved when switching between multiple 
tasks. After reviewing relevant work from the task switching paradigm, we turn to 
empirical support for cognitive inhibition and techniques for measuring inhibition. We 
then discuss relevant work on the potential role of inhibition of task sets and contrast 
“activation-only” models of task switching with models that include inhibition. Finally, 
we report a series of experiments that address if, and under what conditions, the 
inhibition of irrelevant task sets may occur and that also offer new ways in which 
inhibition can potentially be measured. 
Task Schema Activation and Inhibition 
Norman and Shallice (1980/1986) proposed that schemas, or programs of action 
and thought, exist in mutually exclusive competition for selection. Because processing 





any one time. According to their influential model, the selection of schemas for action 
could be modulated by a control mechanism they termed the Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS), which could influence selection through “the application of extra 
activation and inhibition to schemas.”  This control mechanism’s output is attention, 
which serves to modulate the activation and inhibition values of task schemas through its 
application. In addition to activation of relevant schemas, Norman and Shallice posited 
inhibition as a critical process of the attentional control system, and they noted that the 
specific role that inhibition plays in selection is still an open question. 
The theoretical SAS model has been applied to experimental paradigms that 
examine how participants switch attention between multiple tasks. For example, Rogers 
and Monsell (1995) showed that longer response times (RTs) on task switch trials than on 
task repeat trials, even when the task switch was predictable. However, this “switch cost” 
decreased as participants had more time to prepare for the new task. The same basic 
effect was replicated by Meiran (1996; 2000) using unpredictable task switches by 
varying the interval between an instructional cue that informed the participant which task 
to perform and the subsequent target stimulus. These authors concluded that this RT 
benefit for increased preparation time suggested an active, endogenous control 
mechanism such as the SAS is operating to bias, “reconfigure,” or adopt the new task set 
(see also Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans 2001). Increased preparation time is assumed to 
produce faster RTs because the new task set will be more activated at the onset time of 
the target stimulus as a result of allowing more time for an activation mechanism to 













Figure 1. A model of an activation-only account of task switching among three (color, 
line, and shape) tasks. Attention (A) is only applied to activating the new (shape) task at 
the onset of the cue. Activation of the old task (color) passively decays but remains above 
baseline and above the activation level of the line orientation task at the onset of the new 
target. 
 
A significant RT cost associated with switching tasks still is found even at the 
longest preparatory intervals (e.g., Meiran 1996;  Rogers & Monsell 1995), however, 
which suggests that some part of the task set reconfiguration process cannot be prepared 
for in advance of the target stimulus. One explanation for these “residual” switch costs is 
that the activation of recently performed task sets persists through later trials, creating a 
form of proactive interference termed “task set inertia” (TSI) by Allport, Styles, and 
Hseih (1994; see also Allport & Wylie 1999). Although TSI is assumed to persist over 
multiple trials and long delays, it is also assumed to passively decay with time (for 
example, see the color task in Figure 1). From this view, increasing the amount of time 
between trials allows for further decay of recently performed but abandoned tasks and 
results in decreased costs in switching to a new task, presumably due to decreased 
interference caused by old task sets. It should be noted, however, that the TSI explanation 
is not mutually exclusive from accounts that assume conscious and goal-driven, or 
endogenous, activation. The two explanations may highlight dissociable components of 













the switch cost, as some of the switch cost can be reduced by simply waiting for the 
passive decay of the old task set, while another component of the cost can be decreased 
by providing more preparation time for endogenous reconfiguration processes to operate 
(see Meiran 2000; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir 2000).  
Other researchers have suggested that there is no endogenous act of reconfiguring the 
new task during a switch, but rather that the benefits from cueing are the result of learned 
cue-encoding processes. Logan and Bundesen (2003) argued that task switch trials result 
in longer RTs than task repeat trials not because of a time and resource consuming 
endogenous process of activating the new task, but rather from a benefit of processing a 
repeated cue on sequential trials in task repeat conditions. By assigning multiple cues to 
each task, Logan and Bundesen found that switching the cue but repeating the task 
resulted in significant costs that in fact accounted for much of the switch cost. Their 
resulting model offers a simpler explanation of task switch costs that does not rely on any 
endogenous control processes. It should be noted, however, that even when such cue-
switch costs are controlled for, significant task switch costs and associated reduction of 
such costs with increased preparatory intervals have still been obtained in certain 
experimental situations (Arrington, Logan, & Schneider, 2007; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Although cue switches may be associated with some 
performance cost, these results suggest a role for endogenous processes in task switching 
that cannot be accounted for solely by cue-encoding processes. 
Cognitive Inhibition 
 If endogenous control processes are critical for activating new task sets, are other 





strong empirical evidence that inhibition does exist at the physiological and neural level, 
such that the activity of some neurons and circuits suppresses activity in other neurons, 
synapses, and circuits (for reviews see Cohen, 1993; Smith, 1992), the notion of 
cognitive inhibition has been more disputed. Given the compelling evidence for 
inhibition at the neural level, some researchers have posited that analogous inhibitory 
processes ought to occur at the cognitive level; that is, certain perceptions, actions, and 
thoughts could serve to suppress other perceptions, actions, and thoughts. Such 
extensions from the neural to cognitive level permeated not only the early work of James 
(1890) and others described above, but also much more recent influential accounts of 
inhibition (e.g., Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Dagenbach & Carr, 1994; Houghton & 
Tipper, 1994; Potts, St. John, & Kirson, 1989). However, many other authors have noted 
that the existence of neural inhibition alone is not sufficient evidence for the existence of 
cognitive inhibition (e.g., Breese, 1899; Diamond, Balvin, & Diamond, 1963; MacLeod 
et al., 2003). 
The dispute concerning cognitive inhibition may stem from the ambiguous nature 
of the evidence in support of inhibition, primarily longer RTs associated with conditions 
in which inhibition is thought to occur. Critics of inhibitory models suggest that longer 
RTs reflect not a process of inhibiting of irrelevant information, but rather the need for 
additional facilitatory processing of relevant information in situations where the relevant 
and irrelevant representations are in conflict. If the criterion for the selection of one 
stimulus over another is a difference threshold between the activation level of the 
relevant and irrelevant stimuli, then the difference necessary for selection could be 





inhibition of the irrelevant, or through some combination of both processes. Proponents 
of activation-only accounts have tended to favor the parsimony of a single mechanism, 
while proponents of dual mechanism accounts (i.e., Houghton & Tipper, 1994) have cited 
the increased efficiency that having both facilitatory and inhibitory processes in the 
system would provide. Such conflicting accounts have emerged in several experimental 
paradigms, including the Stroop task, negative priming, and task switching. 
Inhibition of Prepotent or Habitual Responses 
 In order to perform goal directed behaviors, individuals must be able to resist the 
strong habitual but currently inappropriate responses, whether these responses are caused 
by salient exogenous or environmental triggers or by overlearned, habitual associations. 
Although research has provided strong evidence for inhibition of prepotent responses at 
the neurophysiological level (e.g., Diamond, 1990; Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002), 
the strongest evidence for a comparable cognitive process may come from the Stroop 
paradigm (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991 for review). In this paradigm participants 
are asked to respond to the ink or text color of an incongruent color word, (e.g., “RED” 
written in green ink), and robust RT and accuracy evidence suggests the habitual word 
reading process interferes with the less dominant ink color naming process. An inhibition 
account would assume that some attentional resources are devoted to inhibiting or 
suppressing the dominant word reading representation and response to allow for the less 
dominant response to ink color to be made. Some activation-only connectionist models of 
the Stroop task (i.e., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), however, have accounted for 
performance with considerable accuracy without invoking inhibitory mechanisms. The 





attentional resources to the weaker, less habitual color naming task, thus providing 
enough activation that the participant can respond to the ink color instead of reading the 
color word. Because processing resources are assumed to be limited (i.e., Kahneman, 
1973), allocating attention to the color naming task pathway is automatically and 
indirectly accompanied by decreased activation of other pathways (Braver et al., 2002; 
see also, Posner, 1978). This explanation, however, assumes that all other pathways 
would have decreased activation; no special inhibitory process is applied to decrease the 
activation of a particular pathway. If this explanation were to be generalized to task 
switching, where the strongest conflict is assumed to stem from the most recently 
performed task (i.e., Allport et al., 1994), it would suggest that inhibition is not applied to 
the switched-away-from task during switching, but rather that all other tasks result in 
decreased activation as a function of allocating processing resources to the goal relevant 
task. Although such activation-only models may be more parsimonious, they do not 
explicitly rule out the possibility that an inhibitory mechanism may also operate on the 
switched-away-from task. The amount of interference caused by differing potential 
sources of conflict, such as information from recently performed tasks versus information 
from tasks not performed as recently, have rarely been directly compared (see Mayr & 
Keele, 2000), so it is difficult to know whether all irrelevant information is equally 
deactivated or whether more recently performed tasks may receive increased inhibition. 
Negative Priming 
Negative priming, or the tendency for a slowed response to a stimulus (or 
stimulus aspect) that previously had been ignored (Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985; see also 





Houghton and Tipper (1994), perhaps the strongest proponents of inhibition-based 
models of negative priming, argued that active inhibition is applied to the ignored 
stimulus or dimension, and that this inhibition persists into subsequent trials, thus slowing 
responses to previously ignored items. Although their model is less parsimonious than an 
activation-only (or in their terms, “amplification” only) accounts, they argue that a dual 
mechanism, involving both amplification and inhibition is more efficient in the sense that 
signal and noise can be separated more quickly, resulting in a faster time course for 
reaching a threshold for selection. 
Leading alternative accounts of the negative priming phenomena, however, offer 
a non-inhibitory explanation based on episodic retrieval (e.g., Neill & Mathis, 1998; Neill 
& Valdes, 1992; Neill, Valdes, Terry, & Gorfein, 1992; see also, Logan, 1988, 1990, 
2002). These accounts suggest that the ignored stimulus on trial N-1 is not inhibited, but 
rather that a trace of how a stimulus was processed in past instances is retrieved with the 
new presentation of that stimulus. For example, from this view, if the word “chair” was 
ignored on trial N-1, and then served as the response-relevant stimulus on trial N, “chair” 
would be retrieved with a “do not respond” goal or “tag” from the previous instance. This 
tag would have to be overcome before a response could be made. Thus, specific target 
words are associated with different goals: they must be ignored in some cases and 
responded to others. Such conflict requires additional time to resolve, resulting in the 
observed negative priming performance cost. In this view, as in non inhibitory accounts 
of Stroop, the cost stems from conflict resolution and not from the inhibition of irrelevant 
information, though these differing explanations of the observed RT cost are 






Inhibition of Task Sets 
Turning back to task switching, Mayr and Keele (2000) proposed that abandoned 
goals and task sets do not passively decay, but rather they are actively inhibited.  They 
proposed an endogenous control process that inhibits previously active task sets, 
effectively deleting no longer relevant information from working memory (i.e.,  Hasher 
& Zacks 1988; Hasher, Zacks, & May 1999) such that interference from no longer 
relevant information is reduced, allowing for more efficient processing of information 
related to the new task. This model stands in contrast to the TSI account proposed by 
Allport et al. (1994), which suggests that old task sets passively decay. Because the 
design of Allport et al. employed only two tasks, they could not contrast interference 
stemming from a recently abandoned task set with interference from an old task set not as 
recently performed. Empirical support for Mayr and Keele’s model comes from the 
backward inhibition (BI) effect that they observe across five experiments. In their 
experiments participants are required to alternate among three task sets (e.g., hypothetical 
tasks “A,” “B,” and “C”), thus allowing the researchers to compare switch costs 
associated with switching back to a recently disengaged from task (e.g., A-B-A) with 
costs associated with switching to a task that has not been recently disengaged from (e.g., 
C-B-A). Mayr and Keele demonstrated that the former condition is associated with 
significantly greater costs, and conclude that the additional cost was incurred because 
participants had to overcome the inhibition associated with a recently disengaged task (A) 





Norman and Shallice (1980/1986) asserted that when one schema is selected for 
action, all other schemas are inhibited. Mayr and Keele’s (2000) results suggested that 
while all other schemas may be inhibited to some degree, the task schema most recently 
performed is inhibited to an even greater extent, below the activation level of other tasks 
that have not recently been performed (see Figure 2). However, measuring this type of 
inhibition requires switching among at least three tasks. Overcoming this inhibition could 
constitute an important component of the switch cost (see also, Arbuthnott & Frank, 
2000) that could not be controlled for in the more commonly used two-task experimental 
designs used to study task switching.   
Mayr and Keele’s (2000) evidence of backward inhibition may constitute nascent 
support of such inhibitory processing, but many unanswered questions regarding the 
nature of inhibition in the task switching process still remain. First, some experiments 
have identified boundary conditions where BI is absent, such as when a motor response 
to an activated task was not required in a no-go condition (Schuch & Koch, 2003), while 
others have suggested that task set inhibition is either weak or absent, is not adaptive, or 
can easily be overcome (Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006). It should be noted that Mayr 
and Keele’s experiments utilized trivalent stimuli, or stimuli that contained aspects of all 
three tasks.  While they were able to demonstrate the presence of inhibition through 
increased reactivation costs for previously active task sets, their design did not allow for 
the potential benefits of inhibition – that is, the reduction of interference stemming from 
previously performed tasks – to be measured because their target stimuli contained 
















Figure 2. A model of task switching with activation plus inhibition of the disengaged task 
(color). Attention (A) is applied to activating the shape task and inhibiting the color task 
at the onset of the task cue. Note that the disengaged task (color) is inhibited below 
baseline (and below the activation level of the line orientation task) at the onset of the 
new target. 
 
replicate the backward inhibition effect in novel situations and to examine the potential 
benefit of interference reduction created through the inhibition of old task sets. 
Overview of Experiments 
  The first set of experiments (1A and 1B) served to replicate the BI effect and 
examine important boundary conditions relating to when endogenous inhibitory 
processes may occur in the task switching process. Experiment 1A also addressed 
whether inhibition served only to disengage from the previous task schema or whether it 
also resulted in decreased interference from recently abandoned tasks (i.e., decreased task 
set inertia). Through using bivalent, as opposed to trivalent stimuli with a three task 
design, we could control for whether the irrelevant information in the target stimulus was 
related to a previously abandoned (and presumably recently inhibited) task, or from a task 
that was not as recently abandoned. Thus we were able to measure whether or not 
inhibition of task sets was adaptive in controlling for interference of no longer relevant 














information. Other authors (Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006) have posited that the 
incentive for inhibition should be stronger following bivalent trials because these trials 
contain information that needs to be ignored in order to make a response. However, 
because inhibition is assumed to occur at the abstract task set level (see Mayr, 2007; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000) it may occur regardless of whether the stimulus of a previous trial 
contained irrelevant task information or not. Experiment 1B explicitly examined the role 
of inhibition when responding to univalent stimuli. 
 Previous observations of BI (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003) measured the effect indirectly by examining the time it takes to 
overcome inhibition on a previous trial. Moreover, inhibition has been shown to decay 
over the trial intervals typically used in task switching experiments (see Mayr & Keele, 
2000, Experiment 1B), such that some of the inhibition applied in trial N-1 will have 
decayed by the time that overcoming this inhibition and reactivating the old task is 
measured on the current trial. Experiment 2 served to provide a more direct measure of 
inhibition, by measuring inhibition during the trial on which it occurred, as opposed to 
measuring the process of overcoming inhibition that occurred on previous trials. In 
addition, the cueing paradigm and design utilized in Experiment 2 allowed us to separate 
the often confounded processes of disengaging the previous task from the processes of 








 Mayr and Keele (2000) suggested that backward inhibition is evidence for an 
endogenously controlled process of inhibiting the abandoned task set. In essence, they 
argued that in light of their results, task switching cannot be an “activation-only” process 
of set selection. However, task activation or reconfiguration (i.e., Rogers & Monsell, 
1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001) and task set inhibition may not be the only two 
processes responsible for the RT costs associated with task switching (see Meiran, 2000, 
for discussion). Task set inertia (TSI) of previously active tasks may result in proactive 
interference that must be resolved in responding to the new task (Allport, Styles, & Hseih 
1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999). If a previous task set retains residual activation and occurs 
in the stimulus as an irrelevant dimension, then the values associated with it could create 
interference. For example, consider a trial in which the target consists of red vertical lines 
and the task is color discrimination. If the task on the previous trial (N-1) was line 
orientation, then the residual activation of the line orientation task may result in 
interference stemming from the vertical line “distractor” in the color task stimulus. In this 
example, a task set inertia explanation would predict more interference from a line 
orientation distractor than from a shape distractor because line orientation was the most 
recently performed task (i.e., trial N-1) and thus should have more residual activation or 





Mayr and Keele (2000) argued that the use of inhibition precludes TSI effects: If 
the previous task set is actively inhibited, it cannot retain residual activation that 
interferes with the new task. The studies by Allport et al (1994), as well as most other 
task switching designs (e.g., Meiran, 1996, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) could not 
measure BI, as these experimental designs only employed two tasks. Thus, participants 
were, due to the experimental design, always switching back to the most the recently 
abandoned task set (see Mayr & Keele, 2000). In contrast, Mayr and Keele’s experiments 
employed not only three tasks but also trivalent stimuli, with every stimulus containing 
values associated with all three tasks. Incorporating three tasks allowed Mayr and Keele 
to compare switching back to the most recently abandoned task (A-B-A) to conditions in 
which participants switched to the task not as recently abandoned (C-B-A). However, 
using trivalent stimuli had a drawback in that the degree of potential interference carried 
over from the previous trial could not be isolated because each stimulus has dimensions 
of both of the irrelevant tasks. In this experiment we used three tasks in order to 
potentially replicate the BI effect, but we did so using bivalent stimuli to allow us to 
measure interference from the previous trial as well as BI. This manipulation allowed us 
to examine whether interference in the form of TSI was actively controlled through 
inhibiting recently abandoned tasks, or whether such inertia interfered with subsequent 
trials. If the active inhibition model is correct, one would expect the values of the recently 
abandoned task to cause less interference when it is the irrelevant (distracting) dimension 
on the next trial, because the task and its values were recently inhibited (see Figure 2). 
However, if the passive decay model (Allport et al., 1994) is correct, one should expect 





have the greatest inertia from being recently performed (see Figure 1). The design of this 
experiment thus allowed us to investigate the BI effect using bivalent as opposed to 
trivalent stimuli, and allowed us to separate active inhibition from passive decay or TSI 
models. 
Method 
Apparatus and Participants 
The experiment was run on E-Prime version 1.0 software and displayed on an 18” 
Gateway monitor. Responses were made on a custom built Psychological Software Tools 
serial response box expansion with six button switches. Participants sat a comfortable 
distance from the monitor and response box. Thirty-six volunteer participants, recruited 
from undergraduate psychology classes, participated and received one hour of extra 
course credit for their time. 
Tasks and Stimuli 
The experiment utilized three tasks, each with two associated values – red and 
green for the color task, horizontal and vertical for the line orientation task, and triangle 
and circle for the shape task. Each stimulus had one relevant dimension, which was cued 
in advance of the target, and one irrelevant dimension from one of the other two non-
target tasks. For notation purposes, the letter designating the relevant task will be listed 
first, denoted with a capital letter, while the irrelevant dimension will be listed second in 
lower case. For example, a color task stimulus with a shape distractor would be denoted 
“Cs,” while a line orientation task stimulus with a color distractor would be listed “Lc.” 





Table 1. Stimuli for Experiment 1A. 
 





















Procedure and Design 
After informed consent was obtained, the participants were given written 
instructions describing the tasks they were to perform. They completed one training block 
of 20 trials for each task with no task switches (i.e., 20 consecutive color trials, 20 
consecutive line orientation trials, etc.), and a final training block of 40 trials that did 





analyses. The order in which the participants saw the tasks in the no-switch blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. These training blocks served to familiarize the 
participants with the trial procedure, the tasks, and the responses associated with each 
target type. Each target type (red, green, horizontal, vertical, circle, and triangle) was 
associated with a single button on the response box (i.e., univalent response mapping). A 
diagram of the response box is pictured in Figure 3. Each response key was located 
equidistant from a center finger rest pad, and the locations of the responses were rotated 
across participants to counterbalance the location of each task on the response box. 
Participants were instructed to respond using the index finger of their preferred hand to 
press the response keys.  
After training was completed, participants then completed ten experimental 
blocks consisting of 50 trials each, for a total of 500 trials. They were given an 
opportunity to take a brief, self-timed break between each block, and cumulative RT and 
accuracy were reported to the participants after each block to motivate them to respond 
quickly and accurately and keep them focused on the experimental task. During the 
experimental blocks tasks were presented in a pseudo-random order and each of the 10 
blocks contained a unique sequence of trials, such that neither the task, target stimulus, 
nor cue-target interval (CTI) of the upcoming trial could be predicted based on the 
previous trial or on previous blocks. These design measures were taken to avoid implicit 
or explicit sequence learning effects. The task cue for the upcoming trial was presented 
500 ms after the response to the previous trial and appeared either 500 ms or 1000 ms 







Figure 3. The response box used for all experiments. The small black circles 
represent the response buttons, while the white center circle represents the finger 
rest pad.  
 
Words directly signifying the task, printed in all capital letters (“COLOR,” “LINE” and 
“SHAPE”) served as cues for each task. On approximately one third of the trials 
participants repeated the same task that they performed on the previous trial, while they 
were required to switch to a new task on approximately two thirds of the trials. Half of 
the task switch trials were Backward Inhibition conditions that required participants to 
switch back to the task that was performed on trial N-2 (e.g., Color  Line  Color), 
while the other half were not (e.g., Shape  Line  Color). A task set inertia (TSI) 
variable was also included in the task switch conditions, with the task from trial N-1 
serving as the distractor in one half of the trials (e.g., Cl  Sc). In the other half of trials 
the recently abandoned task was not used as the distractor (e.g., Cl  Sl). The BI and TSI 
variables were crossed and counterbalanced across CTIs, resulting in the task switch 
conditions listed in Table 2. 
Results 
 Error trials, trials immediately following an error, and trials with RTs less than 





Table 2. Task switch conditions for Experiment 1A.  
Trial N-2  Trial N-1 Trial N Condition 
COLOR/line LINE/color SHAPE/color • No BI 
• No TSI 
COLOR/line LINE/color COLOR/shape • BI 
• No TSI 
COLOR/line LINE/color SHAPE/line • No BI 
• TSI 
COLOR/line LINE/color COLOR/line • BI 
• TSI 
 
Note: The relevant stimulus attribute is written in CAPS listed first, while the 
irrelevant (distractor) attribute is written in lowercase, listed second. For example, 
a color task stimulus with irrelevant line orientation information would be labeled 
“COLOR/line”.  
 
factor required that each trial be coded relative to trial N-2, the first two trials of each 
block were also excluded. Trials immediately following an error, trials with RTs less than 
200 ms or greater than 2000 ms, and the first two trials of each block were excluded from 
the accuracy analyses. Within-subject median RTs and accuracy rates were then 
computed for each condition. 
Overall Analyses 
A 2 (Task Switch) x 2 (CTI) x 3 (Task) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used 
to measure an overall switch cost as well to assess the overall difficulty of the three tasks. 
As expected, the task switch cost was reliable, F(1,35) = 87.41, p <.05, with task repeat 
trials (M = 566 ms) being faster than task switch trials (M = 666 ms), resulting in a 100 
ms switch cost. CTI was also significant, F(1,35) = 173.40, p < .01, with faster RTs at the 





Figure 4. Task Switch x CTI interaction for Experiment 1A. 
 
significantly interacted (see Figure 4), F(1,35) = 45.00, p < .01, with significantly longer 
switch costs at the short CTI (106 ms) than at the long CTI (37 ms). This result suggested 
that the participants used the CTI to prepare for the new task (see Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). It should also be noted that the three tasks did differ significantly in their overall 
difficulty, F(2,35) = 21.74, p < .01, with color being the fastest of the three (M = 578 
ms), followed by shape (M = 616 ms), while the line orientation was the slowest task 
overall (M = 655 ms). Task RTs did not interact with Task Switch or CTI, suggesting that 
the task switching or cue based preparatory processes did not differ significantly with the 
difficulty of the three tasks. 
The same factors were included in an ANOVA conducted on the accuracy data. 
The main effects for Task Switch, F(1,35) = 21.02, p < .01, and CTI,  F(1,35) = 14.09, p 



















accuracy. Participants were significantly more accurate when repeating a task on 
consecutive trials (M = .980) than when switching tasks (M = .960), and they were more 
accurate at longer CTIs (M = .975) than at shorter CTIs (M = .966). The interaction 
between Task Switch and CTI was also again significant, F(1,35) = 5.92, p < .05, with 
little difference between the short (M = .979) and long (M = .981) CTIs when the task 
was repeated, but a larger difference between the short (M = .952) and long (M = .968) 
when the task switched. The main effect for Task was also significant, F(2,35) = 7.97, p 
< .01, with the color task (M = .980) showing greater accuracy than the line 
orientation(M = .965) and shape (M = .967) tasks. Task did not interact with Task Switch 
or CTI in terms of accuracy. 
Backward Inhibition and Task Set Inertia Analyses 
The second analysis investigated potential BI and TSI effects (see Table 2 for 
conditions).  A 2 (BI) x 2 (TSI) x 2 (CTI) ANOVA was conducted within the task switch 
trials only. The main effect for BI was significant, F(1,35) = 4.65, p < .05, such that trials 
in which backward inhibition was present (CLC; M = 677 ms) resulted in longer 
RTs than those in which it was not present (SLC; M = 658 ms). This result serves as 
a replication of Mayr and Keele’s (2000) observed BI effect, but with bivalent as opposed 
to trivalent stimuli, suggesting there is a significant cost for reactivating a recently 
abandoned task. The main effect for TSI was also significant, F(1,35) = 5.89, p < .05, but 
in the opposite direction predicted by the TSI account. Trials in which the recently 
abandoned task (the task performed on trial N-1) was used as irrelevant, distracting 
information on trial N were significantly faster (M = 662 ms) than situations in which 





suggests that recently performed tasks create less interference than information from a 
task not performed as recently, providing further evidence that abandoned tasks are 
actively inhibited instead of passively decaying. The effects for BI and TSI are listed in 
Table 3. The main effect for CTI was also significant, F(1,35) = 139.96, p < .01, with the 
long preparation intervals resulting in longer RTs (M = 619 ms) than the short intervals 
(M = 716 ms). CTI did not, however, interact with BI or TSI. 
The same ANOVA was run for the accuracy data, revealing a significant effect 
for BI (see Table 3), F(1,35) = 9.76, p < .01, where BI conditions were significantly less 
accurate (M = .954) than conditions without BI (M = .966), as well as a main effect for 
CTI,  F(1,35) = 10.24, p < .01, where short CTIs were less accurate (M = .952) than long 
CTIs (M = .967). No significant accuracy effect was found for TSI. As with the first 
analysis, accuracy rates were generally high, but where significant effects were found 
longer RTs generally corresponded with higher accuracy rates, showing no evidence of a 
speed-accuracy tradeoff.  
Although the overall difficulty of the tasks differed significantly, we did not find a 
Task interaction with Task Switch or CTI (although see Allport et al. 1994; Allport & 
Wylie, 1999). It could be the case, however, that inhibition is applied differently to each 
of the three different tasks used in this experiment (see Mayr & Keele, 2000). Thus, 
based on the significant Task and BI main effects reported in the previous analyses we 
conducted a 3 (Task) x 2 (Backward Inhibition) posthoc ANOVA for the RT data. The 
analysis revealed main effects for Task, F(1,35) = 12.11, p < .01, and Backward 






Table 3. Exp. 1A: Mean RT and accuracy (and standard error) for Backward 
Inhibition (BI) and Task Set Inertia (TSI).  
 
 RT Accuracy 
No BI 658 ms (17.1) .966 (.004) 
BI 677 ms (20.0) .954 (.006) 
BI Cost 19 ms* -.012* 
 
 RT Accuracy 
No TSI 673 ms (18.5) .961 (.005) 
TSI 662 ms (17.9) .959 (.006) 
TSI Cost -11 ms* -.002 
 
< .05, with no inhibition occurring for the color task but significant inhibition occurring  
for both the line orientation and shape tasks (see Figure 5). 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1A replicated the expected effects in a task switch paradigm: There is 
a cost in RT and accuracy for switching tasks, relative to repeating a task, but that cost 
diminishes as the preparation time (CTI) between the task cue and the target increases. Of 
greater interest in this experiment, however, was the opportunity to investigate how 
inhibitory processes and/or proactive interference from the previous task may contribute 
to switch costs.  
Norman and Shallice (1980/1986) argued that when one schema is activated, all 
other schemas are inhibited. The results from Experiment 1A suggest that this statement 
must be qualified at least to the extent that the most recently performed task schema is 
inhibited significantly more than others. These results support the notion that activation 







 Figure 5. Task X Backward Inhibition in Experiment 1A.  
1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999) from working memory, but rather that they are inhibited 
(i.e., Mayr & Keele, 2000). Specifically, Mayr and Keele suggested that in order to 
switch from task A to task B, task A must be inhibited; if task A is reinstated on the next 
trial, it will take longer to reactivate it than another task. Experiment 1A replicated this 
finding: participants were significantly slower and less accurate in switching back to a 
recently inhibited task (e.g., A-B-A) than they were in switching to a task that was not 
recently performed, and thus not recently inhibited (e.g., A-B-C).  
This experiment also considered whether Task Set Inertia (i.e., Allport et al., 
1994) plays a role in the switching process. In contrast to backward inhibition, TSI 
suggests that the previous tasks cause interference, thus contributing to switch costs. In 
this experiment, we might have expected to see evidence of TSI in carry-over effects in 
the irrelevant dimension of a target. That is, TSI interference would be demonstrated if 



















previous trial (e.g., CsLc). Interestingly, however, the TSI effect of Experiment 1A 
was significant in the opposite direction. Irrelevant information from the most recently 
performed task created significantly less interference than irrelevant information from a 
task that was not performed as recently. This result, in combination with the backward 
inhibition effect, strongly supports the contention that the most recent task is inhibited 
during task switching and thus creates less interference relative to other sources of 
distracting information. 
One could argue, as Mayr and Keele (2000; see also Mayr, 2007) have, that a 
function of task set inhibition is to reduce interference stemming from recently performed 
task sets when performing a new task. These results support that interpretation. The 
boundaries of this explanation will be tested more explicitly in Experiment 1B, where we 
examine backward inhibition in a design consisting of exclusively univalent stimuli, 
where no interference from irrelevant task information is present in the target stimuli. 
It is also noteworthy that neither Backward Inhibition nor TSI interacted 
significantly with CTI. One reason may stem from the problem of measuring inhibition 
only indirectly in the present paradigm, as an increased cost (in the RT of trial N) 
associated with overcoming the inhibition that was applied after trial N-2. This inhibition 
is likely to decay (see Mayr & Keele, 2000) to differing degrees across the trials and 
processes that occur between the time the inhibition was applied and when an RT for trial 
N is measured. Moreover, it is important to note that Mayr and Keele (see Experiments 
1A and 1B) observed that backward inhibition was relatively unaffected by, and appeared 
to be “immune” to, advance task set preparation. Experiment 2 was designed to shed light 





measuring overcoming that inhibition on later trials. We will return to this issue in the 
general discussion, where the relationship between preparation time and inhibition of task 
sets can be discussed in light of the results of all three experiments. 
 Finally, Mayr and Keele (2000, Experiment 1A) observed a relatively small 
backward inhibition effect associated with their color task. Experiment 1A essentially 
replicated this effect, too, by finding no inhibition associated with the color task, but 
significant inhibition with the line orientation and shape tasks. The simplest explanation 
would be that easier tasks (such as color identification, which was the easiest of our three 
tasks in terms of RT and accuracy) may not be inhibited, as they may be easier to switch 
away from. However, our tasks are fairly similar in difficulty, with overall task 
differences accounting for less than 10% of the total RT. It seems unlikely that such a 
small difference in task difficulty could account for essentially a 100% reduction in 
inhibition. Further research is needed with different combinations of tasks to better 






Mayr and Keele (2000) suggested that in situations where there is less 
competition among task sets one might expect to find less inhibition of irrelevant or 
recently abandoned tasks. They suggested that inhibition develops as a result of a build-
up of conflict resolution processes in responding to multivalent stimuli, and little 
inhibition may occur if conflict resolution processes are not necessary. Other evidence 
has suggested that the amount of inhibition present may be modulated by overall 
experimental task demands. For example, Schuch and Koch (2003) found no BI 
associated with disengaging from tasks on trials that did not require a response. 
Additionally, our previous research has indicated that inhibition of specific value level 
dimensions may depend on the proportion of multivalent stimuli, or stimuli requiring the 
resolution of conflict, in the task design (Costa, 2005; Costa & Friedrich, 2006).  
Although Mayr and Keele (2000) assumed that task set competition within a 
multivalent stimulus was important, their experiments did not directly investigate 
whether conflict resolution within a target is a necessary condition for inhibition to occur. 
In this experiment, we examined whether inhibition occurs only when there is potential 
conflict from the task that must be disengaged from (i.e., an upcoming multivalent 
stimulus) or whether it occurs in all task switching scenarios, regardless of whether 
conflict resolution is necessary. We utilized univalent stimuli, or stimuli that pertain to 





and Keele and in our Experiment 1A would still be present. If inhibition of the previous 
task is a result of the process of conflict resolution, then we should find no BI throughout 
the experiment, as all trials are univalent. However, if inhibition of previous tasks occurs 
as a result of the task switch process per se, and occurs even in the absence of conflict 
within the target stimulus, then we should expect to find a significant BI effect.  
Moreover, this univalent design allows us to utilize the task switching paradigm 
to investigate potential inhibition in manner that does not allow for the problematic 
competing explanations of the negative priming effect. The univalent stimuli do not have 
irrelevant dimensions that must be ignored, thus there can be not “do not respond” goal or 
“tag” placed on any particular stimulus or stimulus value. Every instance of a stimulus is 
associated only with a valid response. Thus, non-inhibitory, episodic retrieval models 
cannot account for any observed RT costs in conditions involving backward inhibition in 
this experimental design. 
Method 
Apparatus and Participants 
Apparatus and participant recruitment were the same as described in Experiment 
1A. Thirty-six students participated in this experiment.  
Tasks and Stimuli 
The same three tasks as in Experiment 1A were used, but in this experiment the 
stimuli were univalent, or contained values pertaining to only the relevant task. The tasks 






Table 4. Stimuli for Experiment 1B. 
 











Procedure and Design 
The training procedure, response board, and general experimental procedure were 
the same as in Experiment 1A. The same task cues and CTIs were also used, with half of 
the trials having the short (500 ms) interval and half having the long (1000 ms) interval. 
Once again, the task repeated on approximately one third of the trials and switched on the 
other two thirds. Half of the task switch trials required reactivating the task from trial N-2 
(BI), while the other half did not (no BI). TSI was not examined in this experiment, as all 
targets were univalent and thus had no irrelevant, interfering dimension. 
Results 
Overall Analyses 
The data trimming procedures were the same as described for Experiment 1A. A 2 
(Task Switch) x 2 (CTI) x 3 (Task) ANOVA was conducted on the median RT data to 





main effects for Task Switch, F(1,35) = 109.37, p < .01, and CTI,  F(1,35) = 143.32, p < 
.01, were again significant, with task repeat trials (M = 487 ms) being faster than task 
switches (M = 560 ms) and long CTIs (M = 494 ms) being faster than the short CTIs (M 
=  552 ms). The interaction between Task Switch and CTI was once again significant, 
F(1,35) = 60.07, p < .01, with a smaller switch cost at the long CTI (45 ms) than at the 
short CTI (99 ms). As in the first experiment, there was a main effect for Task, F(2,35) = 
30.53, p < .01, with color being the overall fastest task (M = 488 ms), followed by shape 
(M = 529 ms), then line orientation (M = 554 ms). Task did not interact with Task Switch 
or CTI. 
The same ANOVA was run on the accuracy data, although it should be noted that 
overall accuracy rates were very high (M = .987), and accuracy rates generally mirrored 
RT findings, with the exception of the two-way interactions described below. This 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Task Switch, F(1,35) = 12.50, p < .01, 
with task repeats more accurate (M = .991) than task switches (M = .983). The main 
effect for Task was also significant, F(2,35) = 18.21, p < .01, with the color and shape 
tasks (M = .991 for both tasks) being more accurate than the line orientation task (M = 
.978). There was no main effect for CTI, but CTI did interact with Task Switch, F(1,35) 
= 15.28, p < .01, and Task, F(2,35) = 4.27, p < .05. For task repeat trials, participants 
were more accurate at the short CTI (M = .994) than at the long (M = .987), while for 
task switch trials, participants were more accurate at the long CTI (M = .986) than at the 
short (M = .979). At the short CTI the participants were most accurate performing the 





participants were most accurate on the shape task (M = .994), followed by the color task 
(M = .992). The line orientation task was the least accurate at both the short (M = .982)  
and long (M = .975) CTI. 
Backward Inhibition Analyses 
A 2 (BI) x 2 (CTI) ANOVA was also conducted within the task switch trials. This 
test revealed a significant main effect for BI, F(1,35) = 21.28, p < .01, with backward 
inhibition conditions resulting in significantly longer RTs than when the most recently 
abandoned task did not need to be reactivated (see Table 5). The main effect for CTI was 
also significant, F(1,35) = 169.99, p < .01, with short CTIs (M = 600 ms) resulting in 
longer RTs than long CTIs (M = 513 ms); however, CTI did not interact with BI.  
The same ANOVA run on the accuracy data revealed significant main effect for BI, 
F(1,35) = 4.26, p < .05, and a marginally significant main effect for CTI, F(1,35) = 4.02, 
p = .53. The accuracy effects were in the same direction as the RT effects (with lower 
accuracy corresponding to longer RTs), with the No BI conditions more accurate than the 
BI conditions (see Table 5), and the long CTIs (M = .986) more accurate that the short 
CTI (M = .980). 
 
Table 5. Exp.1B: Mean RT and accuracy (and standard error) for Backward 
Inhibition (BI). 
 
 RT Accuracy 
No BI 548 ms (15.6) .986 (.002) 
BI 564 ms (15.3) .981 (.003) 






The main effects for Task and Backward Inhibition were significant, so we once 
again conducted a 3 (Task) X 2 (Backward Inhibition) ANOVA on the RT data. The 
posthoc analysis revealed main effects for Task, F(1,35) = 12.11, p < .01, and Backward 
Inhibition,  F(1,35) = 6.38, p < .05, and the interaction was also significant, F(2,35) = 
4.38, p < .05. As in Experiment 1A, the analysis showed that no backward inhibition 
occurred for the color task but significant inhibition occurred in the shape and line 
orientation tasks (see Figure 6). 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1A, we found significant RT and accuracy costs for switching 
tasks, with the RT switch cost reduced at the longer CTI. This suggests that participants 
are endogenously preparing new task sets (see Rogers & Monsell, 1995), but a residual 
switch cost remains even with long preparation intervals and univalent stimuli. 
 





















Comparing these results with those of the previous experiment, we find that RTs were 
faster and more accurate for univalent (Exp. 1B) than bivalent (Exp. 1A) stimuli overall, 
but the task switching and preparation processes appear to be the same for the two types 
of stimuli. The Task X Backward Inhibition interaction was also replicated, with the 
color task again being associated with no inhibition. 
Most importantly, we also observed significant backward inhibition in a series of 
trials that contained only univalent stimuli and univalent response mappings. It has been 
argued that backward inhibition develops out of the build-up of conflict resolution 
processes between task sets after the target onset (see Mayr & Keele, 2000, footnote 2). 
The presence of significant backward inhibition with univalent stimuli demonstrates that 
conflict between multiple dimensions of the target stimulus is not necessary for inhibition 
to develop or occur. Inhibition then, appears to occur not to reduce potential interference 
within an upcoming target, but as a more general process of disengaging from old tasks.  
It is important to note that the significant inhibition effects found in this 
experiment cannot be accounted by episodic retrieval accounts, or accounts that suggest 
RT costs stem from having to overcome a “do not respond tag” that was applied to a 
stimulus or stimulus aspect on prior instances. Negative priming paradigms, out of which 
such non-inhibitory accounts were developed (see Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill et al., 
1992), use stimuli that have an aspect that must be responded to and an aspect that must 
be ignored. Similarly, traditional task switching paradigms that use multivalent stimuli 
have a goal-relevant stimulus dimension that must be responded to and interfering, 
irrelevant dimension(s), that must be ignored. The univalent stimuli utilized in this 





irrelevant dimension. Thus there was no stimulus-level information that must be ignored 
in the univalent stimuli, so explanations that utilize “do not respond” tags cannot 
sufficiently explain the observed RT costs found in the inhibition conditions of this 
experiment. 
 Finally, Experiment 1B also serves to justify the use of univalent stimuli in 
Experiment 2. The design and cues to be utilized in Experiment 2 require the use of 
univalent stimuli, so it was critical before implementing such a design to establish that 
both switch costs and backward inhibition do indeed occur in trial sequences that utilize 






One of the major problems associated with measuring inhibitory processes for 
both negative priming and for backward inhibition in task switching paradigms has been 
that inhibition itself is not directly observed. Rather, inhibition is inferred based on 
increased RTs associated with overcoming inhibition from previous trials. In negative 
priming paradigms, inhibition is inferred through the slowing of a response to a target 
that had been ignored on a previous trial (e.g., Tipper, 2001). In task switching, backward 
inhibition is inferred through longer RTs for switching to a task that had been more 
recently abandoned. Although the mechanisms responsible for each form of inhibition 
may differ (see Mayr & Keele, 2000), both paradigms indirectly measure inhibition that 
occurred on a previous trial. More specifically, both paradigms measure additional 
processing time necessary to overcome inhibition that was assumed to occur on a 
previous trial. These indirect measures have provided data that suggest inhibitory 
processes are occurring but have also left room for alternative explanations for the 
apparent inhibitory processes. 
Experiment 2 provides a way to potentially measure inhibition within the trial it is 
assumed to occur on, rather than measuring the process of overcoming of previous 
inhibition. In both the alternating runs (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and explicit cueing 
paradigms (e.g., Meiran 1996, 2000) used to study task switching, the participants are 





target stimulus. Thus, they can begin activating or reconfiguring the new task and 
potentially begin inhibiting or disengaging from the old task in advance of the target 
(Mayr & Keele, 2000). Activation and inhibition processes and the benefits in RT 
associated with each process are confounded in the pretrial period. The present 
experiment introduces a method by which these processes can be separated by using three 
tasks and a form of “transition” cues (Fortsmann, Brass, & Koch, 2005; Schneider & 
Logan, 2007) that inform the participant whether to switch tasks (“SWITCH”) or repeat 
the same task (“REPEAT”) in advance of the target. These transition cues, however, do 
not inform the participant which of the three tasks will be upcoming. In the task switch 
condition, this potentially will allow the participants to begin switching away from or 
inhibiting the old task without allowing them to begin reconfiguring the new task, 
because they do not know which of the two potential other tasks will follow. For 
example, if participants perform the Color task on trial N-1 and is then given a 
“SWITCH” cue, they can begin switching away from the Color task but cannot begin to 
prepare the Line or Shape task, because they do not know which of the two potential 
tasks will be upcoming. In this way, we will be able to directly measure the RT benefits 
associated with inhibiting the old task separately from the benefits of preparing the new 
task. Moreover, we will be able to measure the time course of the inhibition of task sets 
through the use of a CTI variable, an observation that was not possible in previous 








Apparatus and Participants 
The apparatus and recruitment processes were the same as described in the 
previous two experiments.  
Tasks and Stimuli 
The three tasks from the earlier experiments were used again. The experiment 
utilized only univalent stimuli, as in Experiment 1B (see Table 2). 
Procedure and Design 
The training procedure, response setup, and general experimental procedure were 
the same as described in the earlier experiments. As in the previous experiments CTIs of 
500 ms (short) and 1000 ms (long) were used and approximately one third of the trials 
were task repeats and two thirds were task switch trials. In this experiment, however, in 
addition to using the explicit task cues of “COLOR,” “LINE,” and “SHAPE,” to cue the 
respective tasks, we also included neutral cues (“XXXXX”) that contained no 
information relevant to the upcoming task, as well as transition cues that instructed the 
participant to switch tasks (“SWITCH”) or repeat the same task (“REPEAT”). The logic 
of the “SWITCH” cue is that, like the “XXXXX” cue, it does not allow the participants to 
prepare the specific upcoming task. However, unlike the “XXXXX” cue, it does 
potentially allow them to begin disengaging from or inhibiting the previously performed 
task. This cue type allowed us to separate performance benefits associated with preparing 
the new task in advance (i.e., the explicit cues) from benefits associated only with 





cues from which participants receive no useful information in advance (see Table 6). 
Each cue type appeared in approximately equal frequency (one third explicit, one third 
process, and one third neutral cues) and was counterbalanced across task repeat and task 
switch trials and the two CTIs. 
Results 
For the RT data, main effects for Task Switch, F(1,35) = 225.52, p < .01, and 
CTI, F(1,35) = 103.46, p < .01, were observed. Task repeat trials (M = 576 ms) were 
faster than task switch trials (M = 690 ms) and the long CTIs (M = 615 ms) were faster 
than the short (M = 651 ms). The interaction between Task Switch and CTI was also 
significant, F(1,35) = 24.85, p < .01, once again showing significantly larger costs for 
switching tasks at the short CTIs (126 ms) than at the long CTIs (102 ms).  
 
Table 6. Cue Condition examples for Experiment 2. The top three rows depict 
task repeat conditions while the bottom three rows depict task switch conditions. 
 
Trial N-1 Task Trial N Cue Trial N Task Processes 
Color “COLOR” 
(Explicit) 
Color • Set maintenance  












• Reconfiguration of new task 
(i.e., shape) 
• Explicit cueing of new task 















The main effect for Cue Type was also significant, F(2,35) = 117.26, p < .01, with 
the explicit cues (COLOR/LINE/SHAPE) resulting in the fastest RTs (M = 578 ms), 
followed by the transition cues (REPEAT/SWITCH; M = 633 ms), and then the neutral 
cues (XXXXX; M = 689 ms). Cue Type also interacted with CTI, F(2,35) = 25.86, p < 
.01 (see Figure 7), reflecting the relative usefulness of the cue in preparing for a task 
switch. Post hoc dependent samples t-tests revealed a large benefit for the longer 
preparation times for the explicit cues [t(35) = 8.61, p < .01], a smaller but significant 
benefit for the transition cues [t(35) = 6.82, p < .01], and no significant RT benefit for the 
neutral cues [t(35) = 1.50, p = .143]. 
Of particular interest is the significant Cue Type X Task Switch interaction, 
F(2,35) = 99.05, p < .01. Post-hoc dependent sample t-tests conducted to examine this  
 



















interaction showed that transition cues resulted in faster RTs than the explicit cues in the 
task repeat trials, t(35) = 2.15, p < .05, but that explicit cues were faster than the process 
cues in the task switch trials, t(35) = 11.82, p < .01 . The neutral cues resulted in the 
longest RTs for both the task repeat and task switch conditions (see Figure 8). A final 
planned comparison dependent samples t-test showed that the transition cues were 
significantly faster than the neutral cues in the task switch condition, t(35) = 4.86, p < 
.01,  demonstrating a significant benefit for the “SWITCH” cue compared to the neutral 
“XXXXX” cue. 
The accuracy ANOVA for the same factors revealed a significant main effect for 
Task Switch, F(1,35) = 7.56, p < .01, with task repeat conditions (M = .985) being more 
accurate than task switch conditions (M = .974). The Task Switch X CTI interaction was 
appraoching significance, F(2,35) = 4.09, p = .051, with short CTIs being marginally 
 



















more accurate than long CTIs in the task repeat conditions (M = .987 and .983, 
respectively), but less accurate in the task switch conditions (M =  .973 and .976, 
respectively). Finally, the Task Switch X Cue Type interaction was significant, F(2,35) = 
10.20, p < .01, with the transition cues being less accurate (M = .974) than the explicit (M 
= .989) and neutral cues (M = .991) in the task repeat conditions, but more accurate (M = 
.977) than the explicit (M = .975) and neutral (M = .972) cues in the task switch 
conditions. This interaction reveals a speed accuracy trade-off for the transition cues in 
the task repeat conditions, where RTs were faster but responses less accurate. 
Discussion 
 The results for Experiment 2 again replicate basic task switching effects, showing 
a significant switch cost and significant reduction of that switch cost with increased 
preparation time, and thus validating the use of the process cueing procedure used in this 
experiment. While longer preparation times (CTIs) were associated shorter RTs for both 
explicit and transition cues, no such benefit for preparation time was associated with the 
neutral (“XXXXX”) cues, presumably because the latter cue type contained no useful 
information to prepare with during the CTI. It appears the amount of benefit is directly 
related to the amount of useful information in the cue. The explicit cues (and the 
“REPEAT” transition cue in the task repeat conditions) provided the participants with 
advance knowledge of the specific task that would be upcoming, and as expected those 
cues were associated with the largest benefits. The “SWITCH” transition cue informed 
the participants, in essence, that they would not be performing the task that they had 
performed on the previous trial, although it did not provide them with information as to 





significant benefits relative to the neutral cues in the task switch conditions, 
demonstrating some performance benefit for being able to inhibit the previously 
performed task, even if the upcoming task cannot be prepared. We were thus able to 
observe significant benefit for task set inhibition that was not confounded by task set 
preparation. Moreover, we were able to measure this RT benefit of inhibition within the 






 The experiments reported here used three variations of the task switching 
paradigm to explore the issue of cognitive control, specifically to investigate the role of 
inhibitory processes in switching between multiple tasks. Experiments 1A and 1B 
replicated Mayr and Keele's (2000) backward inhibition effect, offering support for the 
notion that recent tasks are inhibited in the process of switching to performing a new task. 
These experiments provide evidence for inhibition with both univalent and bivalent 
stimuli and provide for a direct comparison between inhibitory and passive decay 
accounts of abandoned task sets. Experiment 2 examined the role of inhibition through 
the use of transition cues. The use of such cues allowed us to measure inhibition directly 
and separate the processes of inhibiting an old task from activating a new one. This 
experiment demonstrated that, when switching tasks, a specific inhibitory process does  
operate to disengage from the task performed on the previous trial. 
Basic Task Switching Effects 
 Several results found across a wide variety of task switching paradigms (e.g., 
Liefooghe, Demanet, Vandierendonck, 2009; Meiran, 1996, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995) generally are taken as evidence of an endogenous process of task set 
reconfiguration that is performed in advance of the onset of the target stimulus (but see 





switched generally yield longer RTs and lower accuracy rates than trials in which the N-1 
task is repeated, resulting in a switch cost. Longer preparation intervals (CTIs) yield 
shorter RTs overall and are also accompanied by a reduction in the switch cost. It is 
assumed that participants use the preparation intervals to prepare the new task in advance 
of the target stimulus. These effects, found in all three of our experiments, provide 
evidence of a control process of activating the new task set. 
It is important that this pattern of effects also was found in Experiment 1B, which 
utilized only univalent stimuli. It has been argued (e.g., Meiran, 2000) that switch costs 
should occur only when there is competition or conflict within the target stimulus (i.e., 
multivalent targets) or at the response level (i.e., when one response key maps to both the 
triangle and red response). Neither source of conflict is present in the targets or response 
setup in Experiment 1B, yet the pattern of switch costs, and reduction of those costs with 
longer preparation intervals, appears the same as in Experiment 1A when multivalent 
stimuli were used. This manipulation is important because it removes the additional 
attentional demand of having to select between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimension in the target.  Moreover, with multivalent targets potential effects stemming 
from the presence of irrelevant information in the target, such as negative priming of 
previously ignored information, may influence the task switching process (Costa, 2005). 
These factors may constitute significant components of the switch cost and the resolution 
of these sources of conflict may require cognitive control processes, but they are not 
specific to the process of switching between abstract task sets. Experiment 1B avoids 





dimension through the use of univalent stimuli and responses, and thus provides a more 
“pure” measure of the switch cost and of the benefits of advance preparation of task sets. 
Experiment 2 provides a somewhat different but interesting window into the 
preparation processes following a cue. The interaction of Cue Type X CTI was 
significant, with a benefit for longer preparation times for the explicit and transition cues, 
but not for the neutral cues. The lack of benefit for the neutral cues at longer CTIs would 
be expected based on the logic of the endogenous task set reconfiguration model, as the 
neutral cues (“XXXXX”) did not contain useful information with which to prepare – any 
of the three tasks could follow such a cue. Interestingly, the “SWITCH” transition cues 
were associated with a significant CTI benefit (see Figure 7) and were faster relative to 
the neutral cues in the task switch trials (see Figure 8). An activation-only model (e.g., 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) would not be able account for such 
benefits because the “SWITCH” cues do not provide information allowing participants to  
prepare a specific task in advance of the target stimulus. 
Task Set Inhibition 
 The most compelling empirical evidence that old task sets are inhibited when 
switching to a new task stems from backward inhibition (see Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; 
Hubner, Deisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Shuch & Koch, 2003), 
in which switching back to recently abandoned task set results in a performance cost 
relative to switching to a task that was not recently abandoned. Such designs typically 
utilize three tasks where A-B-A task sequences are compared to C-B-A task sequences. 





A when switching away from it on trial N-1 must be overcome in order to reactivate task 
A on trial N.  
 In Experiments 1A and 1B we found significant backward inhibition associated 
with bivalent and univalent stimuli, respectively. The demonstration of backward 
inhibition is important in itself, but it is particularly notable that we observed a significant 
backward inhibition effect of roughly the same size for both the univalent and bivalent 
targets. Previously, Lien, Ruthruff, and Kuhns (2006) found that switch costs were 
insensitive to whether the previous trial was univalent or bivalent, and they suggest that 
inhibition is either weak or absent, easily overcome, or nonadaptive. The logic of their 
conclusions is based on the assumption that the incentive for inhibition would be stronger 
in the case of bivalent stimuli in which irrelevant task information within the target must 
be ignored. Our results, however, indicate that this is not the case. Rather, the presence 
and the strength of inhibition is insensitive to the valency of the target stimuli in the 
design. No target level or response level conflict or a need for conflict resolution within 
the target is required to trigger inhibitory processes. We find this result particularly 
important in terms of external validity because in many real world task switching 
scenarios, stimuli and responses are often not “multivalent,” as they are in laboratory task 
switching scenarios. In real environments, we often switch attention between tasks and 
respond to stimuli that do not conflict in terms perceptual qualities or responses and these 
results suggest we still inhibit recently performed tasks in the process of switching to 
performing a new task in these situations. Inhibition of old tasks and old task information 





 Interestingly, we found significant inhibition associated with the shape and line 
orientation tasks, but not with the color task in both Experiments 1A and 1B (see Figures 
5 & 6, respectively). A relatively small amount of inhibition associated with the color 
task was also found by Mayr & Keele (2000, Experiment 1a). One explanation for the 
lack of inhibition associated with the color task could stem from task difficulty; in our 
experiments, the color task was the fastest in terms of RT. However, the explanation that 
easy tasks are not inhibited seems oversimplified, for why would an approximate 10% 
reduction in latent RTs lead to essentially a 100% reduction in the amount of inhibition 
applied when disengaging from such a task? Other plausible explanations could stem 
from the nature of the color task or color processing and identification itself, and how this 
task differs from the other tasks used in our and Mayr and Keele's designs. Because 
backward inhibition is a measure of overcoming inhibition applied previously to a task 
set, it could be the case that color task dependent inhibition is easier to overcome, 
resulting in smaller or insignificant costs for reactivating that particular task. 
Understanding when inhibition is applied and when it is not could have important 
implications more generally for cognitive control, but further research is needed to 
resolve this question.  
 We did not observe significant interactions between Backward Inhibition and CTI 
in Experiments 1A and 1B. This finding also replicates a similar observation by Mayr 
and Keele (2000, Experiments 1a & 1b), in which they conclude backward inhibition 
seems “immune” to advanced preparation. The CTI of trial N, however, is not the interval 
in which the observed inhibition is assumed to occur; rather, the CTI is the interval in 





roughly the same amount of preparatory benefit can be received from increased CTIs 
when reactivating a task that was recently inhibited or when preparing one that was not 
recently inhibited. 
Experiment 2 incorporated transition cues, which were designed to trigger the 
process to be performed (repeat the previous task or switch to a new task) without 
explicitly triggering the specific task to be performed on the upcoming trial. In the case of 
the ‘SWITCH” cue, the participants could not begin preparing the new task because they 
did not know which of the two other tasks would be upcoming; however, they could 
possibly begin disengaging from the old task because they knew the task would be 
switched. This design allowed us to decouple processes related to preparing the new task 
from processes related to disengaging from old tasks. We found a significant benefit for 
this “SWITCH” relative to the neutral “XXXXX” cue, which suggests that significant RT 
benefits are associated with being able to perform only disengagement processes in 
advance of the cue. It has not been possible to investigate this possibility with previous 
research utilizing transition cues because in those cases only two tasks were used and 
thus, in the case of the switch cues, participants always knew which task they would be 
performing in advance of the target. It should be noted that in this experiment we did find 
a significant benefit for these transition cues at the longer preparation intervals (see 
Figure 7), where we were able to measure inhibition more directly, during the trial it was 







Task Set Inhibition Versus Task Set Inertia 
Allport et al. (1994; see also Allport and Wylie, 1999) have suggested that 
previously relevant task information retains persisting facilitation, know as task set 
inertia, that creates proactive interference in later trials, especially when the target stimuli 
on those trials are bivalent and contain information from the previously relevant task. 
Meiran (2000) provided supporting evidence of TSI by demonstrating that interference 
from the previous task is diminished when the interval between the response from one 
trial and the cue for the next is increased. This explanation of what happens during a task 
switch contrasts that of Mayr and Keele (2000), who argued that the activation level of 
the previous task set is actively inhibited and thus does not persist to the next trial.  As 
noted previously, however, the studies that demonstrated TSI used only two tasks so that 
analyses of the relative activation level of the disengaged task were not possible. 
Similarly, Mayr and Keele’s design, using trivalent stimuli so that aspects of all possible 
task sets were present in the target stimulus, did not allow an analysis of whether the 
abandoned task interfered if it appeared as an irrelevant dimension in the target. 
In Experiment 1A, each target had one relevant and one irrelevant dimension, so 
it was possible to compare performance when the irrelevant dimension was the 
abandoned task from the previous trial and when it was not. The model of Allport et al. 
would predict more interference when the target contained an irrelevant dimension from 
the task performed on trial N-1, because such a task set has the most inertia. Mayr and 
Keele's model would predict less interference from such a bivalent stimulus, as the task 
performed on trial N-1 has presumably been recently inhibited and thus should contain 





significantly less interference when the irrelevant dimension was from the recently 
abandoned task. This result is consistent with and supports the evidence of backward 
inhibition, demonstrating that the disengaged task is inhibited rather than maintaining 
some persisting activation. While our results from Experiment 1A do not rule out the 
possibility that some residual activation of old task information could persist, we show 
that this interference is controlled through the inhibition of old task sets, such that 
information from the most recently performed task interferes less than information from 
other tasks. This finding also suggests that the process of inhibiting task sets has adaptive 
benefits, a notion challenged by previous work (see Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006).  
In general, then, the results of these experiments suggest that the process of 
allocating attentional resources to a new task goal is not merely accompanied by passive 
deactivation of all other task goals. While such indirect deactivation may occur due to 
limited processing resources being allocated elsewhere, the present results show that 
recently abandoned tasks are deactivated more than all other irrelevant tasks. The fact 
that all irrelevant tasks are not deactivated equally suggests inhibition is applied to tasks  
that are switched away from and that this inhibition persists into later trials. 
Conclusions 
Overall, these experiments offer strong support to the notion that old task sets, or 
those from which attention is disengaged in order to perform a new task, are actively 
inhibited. These data cannot be accounted for with activation-only models. Employing 
the task switching paradigm as opposed to negative priming or other paradigms to study 
these inhibitory control processes has allowed us to avoid several problems traditionally 





In contrast to paradigms in which inhibition is assumed to occur at the stimulus or 
stimulus value level, the task set inhibition demonstrated in these experiments occurs on 
the abstract task set level (see Mayr, 2007; Mayr & Keele, 2000). This type of inhibition 
at the task set level is consistent with the original conception of executive control 
processes detailed in Norman and Shallice’s (1980/1986) model. Moreover, the stimuli 
used in Experiment 1B and Experiment 2 were univalent and thus did not have irrelevant 
(and possibly competing or conflicting) dimensions or values that were ignored on a past 
trial but must be responded to on a subsequent trial. These univalent stimuli, then, cannot 
be said to be recalled with a “do not respond” memory trace that causes the observed 
pattern of results. Based on the present results, inhibition of the abstract task set serves as 
the best explanation to account for these data.    
Although adding active inhibition to the set of control processes involved in task 
switching does add complexity, these experiments show that there may be performance 
benefits associated with such a process. Inhibition typically has been demonstrated as a 
cost for reactivating previously inhibited information, but in contrast we have shown that 
it also results in decreased interference from information associated with previously 
performed tasks (Experiment 1A). In everyday life, previously performed tasks or 
previously attended to information can interfere with current processing through 
remaining in working memory and drawing resources away from the current goal, even 
when there is no direct perceptual or response conflict between the old information and 
the new goal. We have demonstrated that inhibition does still occur in such situations 





from working memory could, in many scenarios, result in more efficient performance of 
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